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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In this appeal, Serra Frank was charged in three separate cases that proceeded to one
consolidated trial. In all three cases, Ms. Frank faced a misdemeanor charge of possession of
marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. 1 Prior to the trial, Ms. Frank presented the trial
court with volumes of medical evidence in support of her request to present a necessity defense.
The trial court refused to permit the jury to be instructed on necessity for any of her charges.
Ms. Frank raised this issue on intermediate appeal, and the district court affirmed the trial
court. She now comes before this Court and asserts that the trial court (along with the district
court) erred both when it denied her motion to instruct the jury regarding the necessity defense at
her trial and when the trial court denied her motion to reconsider this ruling.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In this consolidated appeal, three cases against Serra Frank-all centering on her alleged
possession of marijuana and paraphernalia-were tried together2 before a jury that was not given
the benefit of an instruction regarding necessity for their consideration at trial. The first charge
arose out of a traffic stop of another person in late 2015 3 . On December 27 of that year, police
1

Ms. Frank also was charged with resisting and obstructing an officer in CR-MD-2015-18202,
but was acquitted of this offense at trial. (R., p.561.)
2

The consolidation of these three cases was at Ms. Frank's request and therefore is not at issue
in this appeal.
3

Rather than cite to the individual criminal case number for each of the three consolidated cases
in this appeal, because each of these sets of charges arose in successive years, Ms. Frank refers to
these cases herein in accordance with the year in which the charge was filed-i. e. 2015 case,
2016 case, and 201 7 case.

5

pulled over a car in which Ms. Frank was a passenger. (12/1/17 Tr., p.75, L.22 - p.77, L.14.)
Ms. Frank was initially fully compliant with the officers and provided them with her name and
identification. However, when officer an officer later tried to order her out of the car during a
dog sniff to detect drugs, Ms. Frank did not roll down the window or leave the car. (12/1/17 Tr.,
p. 78, L.11 - p. 79, L.25.) When Ms. Frank did not comply with the officer's subsequent orders to
get out of the car, she was physically taken out and arrested for resisting or obstructing a police
officer. (12/1/17 Tr., p.80, L.1 -p.81, L.18.)
Ms. Frank had her purse with her when she was taken out of the car. (12/1/17 Tr., p.81,
L.19 - p.82, L.4.) Police took the purse from her prior to putting her in handcuffs. (12/1/17 Tr.,
p.82, Ls.2-23.) During the drug dog sniff of the outside of the car, the dog apparently showed
interest in Ms. Frank's purse - according to police testimony, the dog alerted on it. (12/1/17 Tr.,
p.147, L.13 - p.149, L.7.) Law enforcement searched through Ms. Frank's purse where they
found a glass pipe and a film canister containing a small amount of marijuana. (12/1/17 Tr.,
p.149, Ls.8-15.)

Ms. Frank was charged with possession of marijuana, possession of

paraphernalia, and resisting or obstructing a police officer. (R., pp.285-286; 491-492.) The case
was initially set for a jury trial on November 3, 2016. (R., p.310.) From the moment her case
was set for trial, Ms. Frank noted on the trial status memorandum that she would be requesting to
present a necessity defense at trial. (R., p.310).
Shortly after being arrested, Ms. Frank was cited a second time while protesting at a rally
focusing on efforts to legalize marijuana in early 2016. (12/1/17 Tr., p.184, L.1 -p.176, L.25.)
Ms. Frank spoke at the rally while holding a bag that had a marijuana leaf imprinted on it.
(12/1/17 Tr., p.175, L/18 - p.176, L.2.) Police stepped in to cite4 her during her speech when
4

There was conflicting testimony at trial regarding whether Ms. Frank was actually placed under
arrest or was cited and released for these charges. Compare 12/1/17 Tr., p.176, Ls.3-12 with
6

Ms. Frank expressed her intent to smoke marijuana on the capitol steps. (12/1/17 Tr., p.176,
Ls.3-12.) Ms. Frank was compliant with police and willingly handed over her wallet, which
contained a small marijuana joint.

(12/1/17 Tr., p.176, Ls.18-25.)

She was charged with

possession of marijuana and paraphernalia. (R., p.660.)
In her response to the State's request for discovery in the 2016 case, Ms. Frank responded
with the curriculum vitae (CV) of an expert she intended to call at trial in support of a necessity
defense, Dr. Sunil Aggarwal, along with a summary of the doctor's findings regarding Ms.
Frank's condition of interstitial cystitis as it relates to that defense. (R., pp.674-704.) She also
filed a motion and memorandum in support requesting both to present evidence on a necessity
defense and for a jury instruction on the same. (R., pp.705-709.) Along with this motion, Ms.
Frank presented an affidavit from Dr. Aggarwal in support of the request. (R., pp.710-712.) The
report of Dr. Aggarwal, his affidavit, and the interview summary and findings were admitted as
exhibits at the subsequent hearing on these motions. (3/13/17 Tr., p.5, L.16-p.6, L.1.)
In the third of her cases that were consolidated for trial, Ms. Frank was likewise charged
with possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) and possession of paraphernalia.

(R.,

pp.120-121.) These charges arose exactly one year after the 2016 charges. As before, Ms. Frank
was participating in a peaceful protest at the time with the aim of amending Idaho's marijuana
laws. (12/1/17 Tr., p.216, L.19 - p.217, L.9.) Ms. Frank also spoke during this second protest
and held up a small item that Ms. Frank later told police was a joint. (12/1/17 Tr., p.217, L.10 p.219, L.21.) She was compliant with police throughout her encounter. Police issued her a third
citation for possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia. (12/1/17 Tr., p.220, Ls.27.)

12/1/17 Tr., p.212, Ls.3-23.
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For each of her charges, Ms. Frank filed a motion with the trial court seeking to present a
necessity defense and asking for the jury to be instructed on this issue. 5 The State objected and
requested a hearing on the matter. (R., pp.326-327.)
The trial court held a hearing on Ms. Frank's motion to present a necessity defense for all
three cases on March 13, 2017. (3/13/17 Tr. 6, p.3, L.4-p.4, L.8.) Following this hearing, the trial
court denied Ms. Frank's motion. In doing so, the trial court found that Ms. Frank had met all of
the prongs of the necessity defense save one: that Ms. Frank did not show that there was a
specific threat of immediate harm. (R., pp.23-28.)
The issue was again raised by Ms. Frank at a status conference on October 3, 2017.
(10/3/17 Tr., p.6, L.7 - p.7, L.24.) Ms. Frank's request to proceed pro se with prior retained
counsel as stand-by counsel was also granted at this hearing. (10/3/17 Tr., p.24, L.15 - P.29,
L.1.) Ms. Frank renewed her request for the trial court permit her to present expert medical
testimony regarding her condition, this time asking for the jury to consider the evidence as it
related to the element of possession. (10/3/17 Tr., p.7, Ls.2-24.) The trial court found that
general evidence of Ms. Frank's medical conditions was not relevant to the issue of possession
itself and denied the request to present this evidence (R., pp.36-40.)
Following the October 3 hearing, and the court's Interim Order, Ms. Frank filed prose
motions seeking a continuance and reconsideration of the trial court's ruling on her request to
present a necessity defense. (R., pp.41-104.) For both motions, Ms. Frank explained to the court
that there was additional evidence that was not presented for the court's consideration regarding
5

Ms. Frank's 2017 case was consolidated into the other two cases pursuant to her Motion to
Consolidate. (R., pp.734-736.)
6

Due to the fact that there are multiple volumes of transcripts in this case, citations made herein
to the transcript are made in accordance with the date of the proceedings being transcribed for
ease of this Court's reference.

8

her medical history and condition and that some of the evidence or argument previously
presented was inaccurate in addition to being incomplete. She further supplemented the court's
record with volumes of medical documentation regarding her condition along with background
information and reports from the expert she intended to call to explain why she was acting out of
legal necessity at the time of her charges. (R., pp.41-104.) The court denied Ms. Frank's motion
to reconsider7, but granted her request to proceed prose. (R., pp.108-109.)
Ms. Frank proceeded to a consolidated trial on all three cases; the jury convicted her of
all drug charges. (R., pp.122-123; 523-524;895-896.)

At some point during or prior to the

morning of trial, Ms. Frank had presented the trial court with additional medical records
(contained in the appellate record as confidential exhibits) as additional proof of the evidence she
was seeking to present at trial in support of a necessity defense. (3/7 /18 Pretrial Tr. 8, P .13, L.11
- p.15, L.8.) The trial court also permitted Ms. Frank to make an oral offer of proof regarding
these additional materials. (3/7 /18 Pretrial Tr., p.24, 1.10 - p.28, L.11.)
She was acquitted of the allegation of resisting or obstructing an officer in the 2015 case.
(R., p.525.) Prior to closing arguments, Ms. Frank renewed her objection to the trial court's
orders refusing to permit a jury instruction on the necessity defense. (12/1/17 Tr., p.261, Ls.112.) Following sentencing, Ms. Frank timely appealed to the district court. (R., pp.134-135.)
On appeal, she raised three interrelated issues, all stemming from the denial of Ms.
Frank's repeated requests to be able to present the jury with her necessity defense at trial:
7

The trial court additionally denied Ms. Frank's request for permissive appeal on this issue. (R.,
pp .111-112.)
8

The pretrial motions and trial proceedings leading up to the swearing of the jury on the day of
trial were not originally contained within the trial transcript, but a second partial transcript of
these proceedings was produced as a separate document. To avoid confusion, citations to the
partial transcript herein are made with the notation "Pretrial" to avoid confusion.

9

whether the trial court erred when it denied the initial motion to present jury instructions on the
necessity defense; whether the court erred when it denied her motion to reconsider the ruling
excluding evidence of necessity and denying her request to present the defense; and whether the
trial court erred when it failed to provide the jury with a necessity instruction. (R., pp.178-186.)
On appeal, the district court affirmed the Ms. Frank's judgments of conviction and
sentences. (R., pp.228-242.) Ms. Frank timely appealed from the district court's Opinion on
Appeal. (R., pp.245-247.)

10

ISSUE
Did The Trial Court Err In Not Permitting Ms. Frank To Present Evidence Of A Necessity
Defense In Her Case And In Not Permitting A Jury Instruction On This Defense?

11

ARGUMENT
I.

Standard Of Review For Intermediate Appeal
"On review of a decision rendered by a district court while acting in its intermediate

appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court's decision." State v. Lantis, l 65
Idaho 427, 428-429 (2019). However, this Court reviews the trial court record independently to
determine whether the magistrate court's findings of fact are supported by substantial and
competent evidence, and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings.

See, e.g., State v. Sunseri, 165 Idaho 9, 13 (2018). Accordingly, while this Court gives due
consideration to the trial court's findings, as a matter of procedure, this Court will affirm or
reverse the district court's determination on intermediate appeal. Id.

II.

The Trial Court Erred In Not Permitting Ms. Frank To Present Evidence Of A
Necessity Defense In Her Case And In Not Permitting A Jury Instruction On This
Defense
A.

Legal Standards For Jury Instructions On Defenses And The Constitutional
Right To Present A Defense

Idaho Code § 19-2132 requires that a trial court to instruct the jury as to "all matters of
law necessary for their information;" this statute further provides that, where an instruction is
requested by a party, the instruction must be given if the court finds that the instruction is a
correct statement of law and is pertinent to the issues presented by the case. See I.C. § 192132(a). "A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on every defense or theory of the
defense having any support in the evidence." State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 328 (Ct. App.
1999).
Toward that end, appellate courts have articulated a four-part test for whether a requested
instruction on a defense to a charge must be provided to the jury. Under this test, the requested
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instruction "must be given where: (1) it properly states the governing law; (2) a reasonable view
of the evidence would support the defendant's legal theory; (3) it is not addressed adequately by
other jury instructions; and (4) it does not constitute an impermissible comment on the
evidence." State v. Garner, 159 Idaho 896, 898 (Ct. App. 2016). In these proceedings, there
does not appear to have been any dispute that the Idaho jury instructions regarding the necessity
defense properly state the law defining that defense. This instruction is not covered in any of the
other instructions that were provided to the jury in this case. Likewise, it is not in dispute that
mere presentation of the necessity defense instruction is not-of itself-an impermissible
comment on the evidence. Therefore, the focus of the issue for this Court is the second question:
whether a reasonable view of the evidence provides some support for this defense in Ms. Frank's
case. She submits that, under the governing standards, it does.
To trigger the court's duty to provide a jury instruction, there must be evidence to support
each prong of the defense for which an instruction is sought. Id. However, the threshold of
proof to meet this test is quite low: "the defendant must present at least some evidence
supporting his or her theory, and any support will suffice as long as his or her theory comports
with a reasonable view of the evidence." Id. (emphasis added). Given this, a trial court errs in
failing to instruct a jury on a defense if there is some evidence in the record that could support
each element of that defense. Id. at 900-901.
The requirement that jury instructions regarding applicable defenses must be given under
certain circumstances reflects another bedrock constitutional principle: that a criminal defendant
has a constitutional right to present a defense. In discussing this right under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the United States Supreme Court has described the right to present a
defense as "the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to
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the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988)
(quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967)); see also State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236,
239 (2009). The right to present a defense is "a fundamental tenet of due process of law." Id.
While there is no right to present irrelevant evidence, the "right to present a complete defense is
rooted in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and includes 'a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense."' State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449,452 (2016).
B. The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Provide Jury Instruction On Necessity
Defense And In Refusing To Permit Ms. Frank To Present Evidence In Support
Of This Defense
The Idaho Supreme Court first recognized in State v. Hastings that the common law
defense of necessity was available in prosecutions for possession of marijuana. 118 Idaho 854,
855-856 (1990). In the nearly three decades that have intervened since the Hastings Opinion, the
Idaho legislature has made no attempt to alter or amend its statutory scheme to exempt the
defense of necessity from those charged with possession of marijuana.

Accordingly, the

potential availability of this defense to a charge of possession of marijuana is established law in
Idaho.
There are four elements to the traditional necessity defense: (1) a specific threat of
immediate harm; (2) the circumstances which necessitate the illegal act must not have been
brought about by the defendant; (3) the same objective could not be accomplished by a less
offensive alternative available to the actor; and (4) the harm caused was not disproportionate to
the harm avoided. Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855. This defense has been incorporated in Idaho
through the operation of LC. § 73-116 and through case law. Id. at 856.

14

1. Specific Threat Of Immediate Harm
It has already been established that a medical condition personal to the defendant may

meet the first prong of the test for necessity; i.e., a medical condition may constitute a specific
threat of immediate harm. See State v. Meyer, 161 Idaho 631, 63 5 (2016); Hastings, 118 Idaho
at 855-856. "[T]he necessity defense requires only 'a specific threat of immediate harm'; there is
no severity threshold either explicitly or implicitly in our language." Meyer, 161 Idaho at 635.
There is no dispute in this case that Ms. Frank suffers from a very real and diagnosable
medical condition: interstitial cystitis. Ms. Frank was diagnosed with this condition in 2009,
after suffering with severe pain and other symptoms for several years prior. (R., p.702.) This is
a chronic condition that, in addition to causing extreme pain, can also cause increased and urgent
need for urination. (R., pp.695-696.) It can cause ulcers, lesions, and tears in the lining of the
bladder along with inflammation of that tissue. (R., p.696.)
The physical symptoms of this condition are chronic and debilitating.

(R., p.695)

According to Ms. Frank's counsel, "A Harvard University Study concluded that the impact ofIC
on quality of life is severe and debilitating, that the quality of life resembles that of a person with
kidney dialysis or chronic cancer treatment." (3/13/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-8.) Because there is no
cure for this condition, the best available current options all focus on palliative care-current
medicine can only work to reduce or prevent the suffering that comes with interstitial cystitis.
(R., p.696.)
While there is no cure for this condition, there are multiple studies cited by Dr. Aggarwal
that show that cannabis treatments have been effective. (R., p.695, 697-700.) One of the leading
case studies further included empirical reports from participants that treatment with cannabinoid
substances were more effective than, and did not present the undesirable side effects of, other
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traditional medical treatments. (R., p.698-699.) Dr. Aggarwal had, himself, treated patients with
this condition during his clinical clerkship in pain management at the University of Washington
Center for pain relief, so he was personally familiar with the suffering this condition causes. (R.,
p.695.)

He had also spoken with at least one other individual with interstitial cystitis who

indicated that treatment with cannabis was "the only treatment she found effective in relieving
her symptoms." (R., pp.696-697.) Dr. Aggarwal noted that the State of Illinois specifically
listed interstitial cystitis as among those conditions for which treatment with medical marijuana
had been approved by their State Department of Health. (R., p.697.)
Of the four elements of the necessity defense, this was the only element that the trial
court-as fact-finder in this case-held that Ms. Frank could not make the required showing.
The trial court correctly found that Ms. Frank "made a more thorough showing of her medical
history and course of treatment than was present in either Meyer or Beavers."

9

(R., p.27.) The

trial court also found that the medical evidence presented by Ms. Frank in support of her request
to present a necessity defense, "identifies cannabis as the best available approach to her
treatment". Id.

However, the trial court found that, because there may be other treatments

available for Ms. Frank's condition, she had not demonstrated either an immediate or a specific
threat to treat what the court termed as her "chronic pain." (R., p.27.)
The district court, sitting in its appellate capacity, likewise found that this element had
not been established, albeit under a differing rationale. Regarding the 2015 charge, the district
9

Appellate counsel was unable to locate the case citation for the Beavers case within the trial
court's order, but consultation of the argument and briefing of the parties, the discussion by the
trial court, and the case law on this issue, makes it readily apparent that the trial court is here
referring to the 2011 Idaho Court of Appeals case of State v. Beavers, 152 Idaho 180 (2011),
which dealt with the request for a necessity defense instruction in a case where the defendant was
charged with trafficking in marijuana, possession of a controlled substance, and delivery of a
controlled substance.
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court held that there was "no need of treatment shown on the occasion of the first arrest," and
also that the second two charges did not show necessity because, at the time of her alleged
possession of marijuana and paraphernalia in these two cases, Ms. Frank was also involved in the
act of political protest of Idaho's marijuana laws. (R., pp.252-254.) Ms. Frank respectfully
asserts that both the trial court and the district court on appeal erred in these conclusions.
a. The Trial Court And The District Court Erred In Finding This Element
Was Not Met Regarding The 2015 Charges In Light Of The Evidence
That Ms. Frank Presented And In Light Of The Trial Court's Factual
Findings Regarding That Element

Beginning with the evidence presented regarding Ms. Frank's initial charge in 2015
(where she was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police), the findings of both the trial
court and the district court on appeal were in error as to this element. The trial court found that
Ms. Frank had presented a more thorough showing as to her medical condition than was present
in prior cases finding that the record did not support giving a necessity instruction. The court
further found that the evidence presented by Ms. Frank demonstrated the use of marijuana as a
"general course of treatment necessary to manage her chronic pain," and that the medical
evidence presented in support of her request "identifies cannabis as the best available approach
to her treatment." (R., p.27 (emphasis added).) Under the liberal standards for provision of jury
instructions on a defense, and the standard set forth in Hastings, Ms. Frank respectfully submits
that these findings should have resolved the matter of whether there was a specific threat of
immediate harm.

The trial court, despite these findings, held that the jury could not even

consider this defense because this was not the only treatment that might have been available for
her condition. Ms. Frank asserts that this holding is inconsistent with governing case law.
This is apparent by looking to the ruling in Hastings, which reversed and remanded the
defendant's conviction so that the necessity defense could be presented to a jury. Hastings, 118
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Idaho at 854-856. The condition that the defendant in Hastings suffered-and that was the basis
for the claim of a specific threat of harm-was the medical condition of rheumatoid arthritis. Id.
at 854-855. The claimed use of marijuana in this context was "to control the pain and muscle
spasms associated with this disease." Id. at 855. While there appears to be no simple cure for
rheumatoid arthritis, it is certainly the case that there are a host of potential options to seek
palliative care for its effects that range from over-the-counter medications to self-care and
physical therapies to prescription medications to surgery on the joints affected.
This array of potential alternative treatments, aside from marijuana use, that are available
as potential treatment options for rheumatoid arthritis did not mean for the Hastings Court that
the necessity defense was somehow unavailable for the possession of marijuana charge. Rather,
it was held to be "for the trier of fact to determine whether or not [the defendant] has met the
elements of the offense." Id. at 856. Ms. Frank's case, and her medical condition, is not
meaningfully different than that of the defendant in Hastings. Like the defendant in Hastings,
Ms. Frank submitted extensive proof that she suffers from a chronic condition that can causeamong other debilitating effects-severe pain, and for which marijuana was "the best available
approach to her treatment" according to the trial court's findings.

While the State, in all

likelihood, may try to argue at trial that the alternatives in Ms. Frank's case may undermine
necessity, the applicable legal standards for this defense indicate that it remains a factual
question for the jury to resolve at trial.
The district court likewise found that Ms. Frank did not meet the threshold showing for
this element because "[t]here was no showing that this was medical marijuana issued elsewhere
for treatment" and because "there was no need for treatment shown on the occasion of the first
arrest." Ms. Frank asserts that both of these rulings were in error. As with the trial court, the
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rationale that Ms. Frank did not submit proof that the marijuana and paraphernalia in the 2015
case were issued as medical treatments from "elsewhere" finds no support in the controlling case
of Hastings-such a requirement is not even suggested in the text. In fact, appellate counsel has
been unable to uncover any case in Idaho that would support this requirement as part of the
analysis. Leaving this aside, to the extent that prescriptions from other jurisdictions for medical
treatment with marijuana has nay relevancy to this issue, Ms. Frank presented just this form of
evidence in her motion for reconsideration. (R., p.807-808.) Prior to moving to Idaho, Ms.
Frank did receive prescriptions for medicinal use of marijuana as a resident in both Washington
and Oregon. Id. Accordingly, even if such a showing did have bearing on Ms. Frank's right to
present a necessity defense (which she submits it does not), she made an evidentiary showing of
past prescriptions for medical use of marijuana in two separate states as part of her past efforts at
palliative care for her interstitial cystitis.
As to the second prong of the district court's analysis-the question of whether there was
a need for treatment at the time of her arrest in the 2015 case-Ms. Frank submits that she
submitted more than sufficient proof on this prong. It is helpful to bear in mind once again the
very low showing that is required: a defendant need only supply at least some evidence
supporting her theory, "and any support will suffice as long as his or her theory comports with a
reasonable view of the evidence." Garner, 159 Idaho at 898 (emphasis added).

Interstitial

cystitis is a chronic and often excruciating condition that can have sudden onslaught and that has
no real cure-much like the arthritis suffered by the defendant in Hastings. Ms. Frank provided
literally hundreds of pages of medical documents, expert reports, and her own testimonials
regarding the nature of this condition and her experience with it in support of her request to
present a necessity defense.

This evidence shows that Ms. Frank does not just suffer with
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interstitial cystitis on some days, and not on others. The evidence that Ms. Frank shows that she
suffers with this condition every day-it is a constant in her life; while her symptoms may show
variation in their intensity, she presented evidence that she experiences some level of
symptomology at virtually all times and that the intensity of these symptoms may increase
without warning. Accordingly, the district court's conclusion that Ms. Frank did not present
evidence showing that she was suffering from interstitial cystitis at the time of her arrest in the
2015 is without support in the record, and is inconsistent with the standards articulated in
Hastings regarding the availability of this defense.

b. The Trial Court And The District Court Erred In Finding This Element
Was Not Met Regarding The 2016 and 2017 Charges In Light Of The
Evidence That Ms. Frank Presented And In Light Of The Trial Court's
Factual Findings Regarding That Element

The trial court in this case did not distinguish between Ms. Frank's 2015 charges, and
those in the 2016 and 201 7 case, in its analysis regarding whether she presented a specific threat
of immediate harm. Given this, Ms. Frank asserts that the trial court erred in its conclusion for
the reasons stated above.
The district court, however, departed from the reasoning of the trial court as to these
charges due to evidence that Ms. Frank was also participating in a political protest at the time of
her two charges in 2016 and 2017. As an appellate court, the district court found that Ms.
Frank's intention was to protest on these two occasions, rather than possessing marijuana as a
treatment for her medical conditions. (R., pp.252-254.) Because of this, the district court found
that the requirement of the immediacy of the potential threat was not met. In addition, the
district court found that Ms. Frank's argument in her Reply Brief that Ms. Frank's actions were
the product of both the purpose of protest and as a medical, palliative treatment for her condition
was not justiciable on appeal because it was not raised separately below, despite the fact that Ms.
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Frank only addressed this argument in response to the contentions raised in the Respondent's
Brief. (R., pp.252-254.) The appellate ruling of the district court was in error on both counts.
As a threshold matter, the district court's ruling on appeal that Ms. Frank's "dual
purpose" argument was not reviewable is not consistent with appellate standards regarding
preservation of issues and the purpose of reply briefs. On appeal, the State asserted that Ms.
Frank's motivation with regard to the 2016 and 2017 cases was "to protest marijuana laws in
Idaho rather than pain management." (R., pp.200-208.) It was the State on appeal that urged the
district court to affirm the trial court on this "alternate basis" from that actually found by the trial
court. (R., pp.200-208.) By the State's own characterization, and in light of the trial court's
findings, this was not a basis for the magistrate's order on appeal and was only raised by the
State within its Respondent's Brief.
The trial court considered and rejected this argument by the State.

(R., p.26.)

It

expressly found that it was "hesitant to endorse the notion that discreet violation of the law is
less offensive than overt violation." (R., p.26.) It would be exceedingly odd for Ms. Frank to
raise an issue in her Appellant's Brief that was decided in her favor on the off-chance that the
State may seek to argue the issue in the Respondent's Brief. Aside from this, such a pre-emptive
argument is not required under the Idaho Appellate Rules or under governing precedent.
Idaho Appellate Rule 35 governs the content of the briefs to this Court (which also
applies to misdemeanor appeals through the operation of !.C.R. 54(f)). In pertinent part, this rule
permits a Reply Brief to be filed "which may contain additional argument on any issue raised

by the parties on appeal".

See I.A.R. 35(c) (emphasis added).

When the State sought

affirmance on an alternate theory-contrary to the actual ruling by the trial court-this was an
additional argument or issue raised on appeal. By plain operation of the appellate rules, Ms.
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Frank was entitled to respond to this theory and argue the self-evident fact that a person may
harbor more than one motivation for an action. Because of this, it was absolutely permissible for
her to address the State's request to affirm on this alternate theory-which was contrary to the
actual finding of the trial court.
Moreover, in recognizing the right to present a necessity defense to a charge involving
marijuana in Hastings, the Idaho Supreme Court noted with approval the variety of contexts in
which a necessity defense can be raised, as found in other jurisdictions. 118 Idaho at 855-856.
One of those contexts was "where the defendants were engaged with political protest" and
subsequently charged as a result. Id. at 855 (emphasis added). This application was cited a
second time by the Idaho Supreme Court in Meyer in analyzing the relatively low threshold for
showing a specific threat of immediate harm.

In finding that the trial court imposed too

restrictive a view on this element, the Meyer Court noted other circumstances cited by Hastings
as supporting the provision of an instruction on necessity, including "disorderly conduct while
engaging in political protest." 161 Idaho at 635 (emphasis added). Far from demonstrating that
a motive to protest politically disqualifies application of the necessity defense, Idaho case law
indicates such a purpose may support this defense under appropriate circumstances.
Accordingly, the district court's appellate findings to the contrary were inconsistent with Idaho
law.
Idaho's implicit recognition of direct protest as a potential basis of a necessity defense is
well-founded and is supported by other jurisdictions as well. In particular, where the person
involved in the protest suffers or will suffer a direct or immediate harm from the action being
protested, cases have held that a jury is entitled to determine the issue of whether the necessity
defense applies to justify the challenged action. See Washington v. Ward, 438 P.3d 588, 595-596
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(Wash. Ct. App. 2019). Further, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho has
recognized that a necessity defense may be available in cases of protest where the charged
conduct falls within "direct civil disobedience"-i.e. where the law alleged to have been violated
is the "object of protest." See U.S. v. Scranton, 25 F.Supp.2d 1131, 1134 (D. Idaho 1997). That
is the case with Ms. Frank's 2016 and 2017 charges.
Consequently, even if Ms. Frank's sole intention in the 2016 and 2017 cases was political
protest-which she vigorously disputes-that intention does not automatically disqualify her
from presenting her theory of a necessity defense on this issue. That the State disputes what her
intentions may have been does not change this conclusion. It merely demonstrates a factual
dispute of precisely the type that our constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial is
intended to resolve. Toward this end, scholars have pointed out the importance of the role of the
jury in determining the weight or credibility of the evidence where political protest is part of the
motivating force in the context of the necessity defense:
The difficult question that must be addressed is how much evidence will satisfy
this 'exceedingly low' burden. In attempting to answer this question it is essential
to remember that in a jury trial the jury is the trier of fact, and that this role
includes determining questions of reasonableness and the credibility of the
defendant and her evidence. Thus, questions of reasonableness and credibility are
central not only to the necessity defense, but also to the role of the jury. Courts,
therefore, must be careful to apply a low standard of production when defendants
raise this defense so that a jury will have the opportunity to evaluate each of the
elements.
Laura J. Schulkind, Applying the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 79, 87 (1989).

Unlike the average protestor (who may or may not be suffering contemporaneous and
direct harm from the policy at issue), Ms. Frank was also-at the time of the rally-a person
who is uniquely, concretely, and directly harmed by the laws being protested in light of her
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medical condition. Her volumes of evidence speak to both her years' worth of efforts at finding
a safe and legal medical alternative to marijuana and to the constant suffering that her condition
caused. She did not cease to be afflicted with interstitial cystitis merely because, at the time of
her citations, she was out in the public and vocal about her medical need for marijuana given her
condition. The specific threat of harm therefore remained the same. To the extent that the State
seeks to discredit whether Ms. Frank was in medical need at the time of her 2016 and 2017 cases,
Ms. Frank respectfully submits that this is a question for a jury to resolve in light of the evidence
on her condition that Ms. Frank placed before the trial court. Although she was in a public place
at the time of her 2016 and 201 7 alleged offenses, this does not make the physical impact of her
condition any less immediate or severe. Accordingly, she respectfully submits that the district
court erred when it held that the fact of her political protest categorically disqualified Ms. Frank
from presenting a necessity defense at trial.
2. Circumstances Which Necessitate The Illegal Act Must Not Have Been
Brought About By The Offender

By its plain terms, the focus of this element of the necessity defense looks at the
relationship between the harm that is the subject of the imminent threat to the defendant and the
defendant's own actions. Where the harm sought to be avoided falls within a continuous string
of events that is brought about by a defendant's own behavior, this element is not met. 10
The circumstances that necessitated Ms. Frank's possession of marijuana and
paraphernalia in this case were her development of a chronic medical condition, interstitial
cystitis. She did not ask for this condition, but merely is attempting to maintain some quality of
10

There is a dearth of case law regarding his particular element of the necessity defense in Idaho.
Although counsel acknowledges that unpublished cases cannot be cited as legal authority in
Idaho, this Court may wish to note that one unpublished case has discussed this element and its
application in some depth. See State v. Detwiler, 2015 WL 1237083 (Ct. App. 2015).
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life as she copes with its debilitating effects. Accordingly, this element was established in the
record.
In this case, the trial court correctly found that the circumstances which necessitated the
illegal act were not brought about by Ms. Frank. "The medical situation afflicting Defendant is
not attributed to any misconduct and would appear to be a naturally occurring condition." (R.,
p.26.) Despite this, the district court in this case found that Ms. Frank's act of protest in the 2016
and 2017 cases rendered this element unmet. (R., p.253.) Ms. Frank has previously set forth that
acts of protest are not outside the ambit of potential application of a necessity defense under
Idaho law, and reasserts those arguments here. However, she also asserts that the district court
erred in this prong of the analysis, as the "circumstances necessitating the harm," even in the
context of protest, focus on the harm that the person protesting is seeking to avert. See, e.g.,

Ward, 438 P.3d at 595-596. In this case, both harms are the same-the pain and suffering that
Ms. Frank faces on a daily basis as a result of her interstitial cystitis, and the need for use of
marijuana as the only effective palliative treatment she has found for this chronic disease without
a cure.

3. The Same Objective Could Not Be Accomplished Through Less Offensive
Alternative
In this case, Ms. Frank provided the trial court with evidence showing the efforts that she
had made using conventional medical treatments for her condition, and that these other
treatments caused side effects that were debilitating to her life and her ability to function.
(3/13/17 Tr., p.10, L.19 - p.12, L.12.)

Her pain symptoms that are associated with this

condition actually began before she received a formal diagnosis of interstitial cystitis following
the birth of her son.

(R., p.711.) In response, her physician prescribed her OxyContin-a
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powerful and highly addictive opioid. Like many, Ms. Frank experienced physical and mental
side effects from this powerful drug that led her to discontinue its use. (R., pp.711-712.)
In her consultation with Dr. Aggarwal, Ms. Frank detailed her other personal efforts at
finding

effective alternatives.

The first treatment applied was a combination of

Dimethylsulfoxide (or DMSO) to encourage healing of her bladder tissues, coupled local
anesthetics and steroids. This treatment was only effective in its first application but did not
alleviate Ms. Frank's symptoms in other applications. (R., p.702.) She had previously taken the
prescription medication Elmiron, but had experienced side effects that made her feel anti-social
and "stressed" in addition to this medication itself causing additional physical pain. (R., p.701.)
This is consistent with the FDA findings that "Severe Emotional Lability/Depression" is the
most common side effect experienced with this drug.

(R., p.702.) Antihistamine and anti-

inflammatory drugs that she tried caused severe drowsiness that prevented her from engaging in
everyday tasks. (R., p.701.) She attempted daily catheterization but that process stopped being
effective to treat her condition; Ms. Frank was also worried that daily catheterization with
bladder installations could cause her body permanent damage. (R., p.701.) Ms. Frank reported
that over-the-counter medications made her overall physical condition worse, rather than better.
(R., p.701.) In addition to these resources, Ms. Frank attempted physical therapy but ended up
missing too many sessions because she was immobilized due to the pain from her interstitial
cystitis and was unable to drive to the clinic. (R., p.701.) The pain management clinic she
visited wanted to prescribe her drugs-including morphine and opioids-that are known to have
devastating physical effects and are highly physically addictive. (R., p.701.)
Moreover, given that the symptoms of interstitial cystitis can have sudden onset, and the
condition itself is chronic and without a cure, Ms. Frank cannot tell in advance when precisely
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this condition will attack. This condition can also worsen over time, as in some patients the
bladder tissue becomes scarred, stiffening and increasing symptoms including the urgent need
for urination. (R., p.696.) Because expert evidence indicates that only palliative care is available
to treat Ms. Frank's condition, the sudden nature of her symptoms does not allow her to know far
in advance when her pain will arise, nor is there a cure.
The district court in this case found that, because there may be other treatments available
for Ms. Frank's condition, she did not meet this element (contrary to the trial court's finding that
this element was met).

This reasoning mirrors the trial court's holding regarding potential

alternative treatments in its ruling on whether there was a specific threat of immediate harm. Ms.
Frank likewise reasserts that the mere abstract existence of legal treatments for a particular
condition does not preclude her from being able to present her theory of the defense to a jury for
their resolution. If the fact of alternative treatments existing-standing alone-were dispositive
and disqualifying, the Idaho Supreme Court in Hastings would never have ruled that the
defendant who suffered from arthritis could present a necessity defense.

But the fact that

alternate treatments existed did not lead the court to disallow this defense. Rather, the Hastings
Court held, rightly, it was "for the trier of fact to determine whether or not she has met the
elements of the offense." 118 Idaho at 856.

4. Harm caused was not disproportionate
Although this prong does not appear to have been in dispute, either before the trial court
or on appeal, Ms. Frank asserts that the trial court correctly found in her favor on this element
under the facts of this case. There is no suggestion that Ms. Frank directly caused anyone any
direct or concrete harm in the process of possessing marijuana and paraphernalia in each of these
three cases. To that end, the trial court correctly concluded that "[ o]ther than the violation of
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law, there is no suggestion that any additional harm was caused by the defendant," and further
found there was not any disproportionate harm in this case. (R., p.27.)

C.

The Trial Court Erred In Denying Ms. Frank's Motion For Reconsideration
Regarding Presentation Of A Necessity Defense
Ms. Frank also asserts that the trial court erred in denying her motion for reconsideration
of its ruling barring her from presenting evidence in support of a necessity defense or providing
the jury with an instruction on this defense.
Although not expressly provided for by the Idaho Criminal Rules, trial courts are
empowered to consider the merits of a request to reconsider their prior rulings in Idaho. See
State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 320-321 (Ct. App. 1988). In reaching this determination, the
Montague court looked to the procedures employed in federal criminal courts. Like Idaho, the
federal criminal rules of procedure do not contain an express provision for motions for
reconsideration. Id. However, federal appellate courts consistently reviewed the grant or denial
of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Id. The court in
Montague held that "the federal approach is sound," and determined that motions to reconsider a
trial court's ruling are proper in criminal proceedings. Id. at 321. When deciding a motion for
reconsideration, the same legal standard of review applies from the original order that had been
previously decided. Monitor Finance, L.C. v. Wildlife Ridge Estates, L.L.C., 165 Idaho 555,
559-560 (2019).
In support of her motion for reconsideration of the trial court's denial of her request to
present a necessity defense and for a jury instruction on necessity, Ms. Frank supplemented
additional materials on the nature of her condition that further showed she was entitled to present
this defense.
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Exhibit H to her motion for reconsideration was an additional report generated by Dr.
Aggarwal after an in-person consultation with Ms. Frank.

(R., pp.806-808.)

This report

contained more details about Ms. Frank's medical condition, including a prior diagnosis in 2005
for adenomyosis-an abnormality of the uterine tissue that led, in Ms. Frank's case, to a vaginal
hysterectomy. (R., p.806.) Even with this surgical procedure, this did not end the chronic pain
that Ms. Frank experienced and that clued doctors in to her eventual diagnosis of interstitial
cystitis. (R., p.806.)
This report also gave the court a fuller picture of the daily pain that Ms. Frank endures as
a result of her interstitial cystitis. This pelvic pain is severe-she compared it to contractions
experienced during childbirth-and radiates from her pelvis to her lower back. (R., p.806.)
Physical strain, exertion, and stress all operate to make this pain worse, so the condition if left
untreated has immobilizing effects. (R., p.806.) She experiences frequent urges to urinateapproximately 12 times a day without treatment and with pain accompanying urination. (R.,
p.806.) The effect of physical exertion on her pain levels also led Ms. Frank to experience
weight gain as a result of not being able to engage in normal physical activity. (R., p.807.)
Ms. Frank attempted pain management under medical supervision with the use of opioid
therapies for three years, from early 2001 through early 2004, until the side effects of these drugs
(physical and mental) made them an untenable option for her well-being. (R., p.807.) In late
2004, Ms. Frank tried using cannabis in an attempt to escape the severe pain she was
experiencing, including periods where she received prescriptions for its medical use from
Washington and Oregon, and found that this was the only effective treatment method for her
physical and mental symptoms of all of the many alternatives she had tried. (R., p.807-808.)
She was less mentally affected and disoriented with cannabis than she had previously been on
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opioids. (R., p.808.) Her pain all but disappeared, her frequency of the need to urinate dropped
dramatically, and-without the pain that had previously come with physical activities-she was
better able to take care of her home, herself, and to participate in daily activities that she had
previously avoided. (R., p.808.)
To the extent that the district court, and trial court, relied on the existence of other
treatments in finding that Ms. Frank should not be allowed to present her theory of defense at
trial, the materials that she submitted on reconsideration showing her exhaustive efforts at
finding alternative relief for her condition demonstrate that she had tried virtually every
alternative to medicinal use of marijuana that was available-even some that may have been
physically dangerous alternatives. She further presented a more full picture of the immediacy of
the harm-the sudden onslaught and severity of her physical symptoms-that she was facing
every day as a result of her interstitial cystitis. Although Ms. Frank submits that the materials
she initially presented were more than sufficient to entitle her to present this defense, the
supplemental materials directly addressed many of the areas of concern raised by both the trial
court and the district court on appeal. According, Ms. Frank respectfully submits that the trial
court's ruling prohibiting her from presenting a necessity defense, and instructing the jury on the
issue, was contrary to her statutory right to have the jury instructed on all matters pertinent for
their resolution and her constitutional right to present a meaningful defense.
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CONCLUSION

Ms. Frank respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Opinion on Appeal of the
district court, and the trial court's judgments of conviction and sentences, and remand this case
for new trials with instructions to permit the jury to be instructed on the defense of necessity.

DATED January 13, 2020.

Sarah E. Tompkins
Attorney for Defendant
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